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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Lester B. Orfield'
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
2
The Act of November 21, 1941, Chap. 4923 provides that the Act
of Congress of February 24, 19334 as amended giving the Supreme
Court authority to lay down rules of criminal procedure after
verdict and the Act of June 29, 19405, giving the Supreme Court
authority to lay down rules of procedure prior to and including
verdict in criminal cases "are hereby extended to proceedings to
punish for criminal contempt of court."
I Professor of Law, University of Nebraska; member United States Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2 For the statutes dealing with or related to criminal contempt see 28
U. S. C. sections 263, 296, 385 through 390, 391, 647, 648, 703, 714-717, 750,
11 U. S. C. sections 11 and 69, 15 U. S. C., sees. 4, 49, 78u, 100, 155, 29 U. S. C.,
sec. 111, 112, 160(h), 161, 209; 7 U. S. C., sec. 499m; and 9 U. S. C., sec. 7;
17 U. S. C., sec. 36; 19 U. S. C., sec. 1333b; 22 U. S. C., sees. 155, 270f; 33
U. S. C., sec. 927; 35 U. S. C., sec. 56; 47 U. S. C., sec. 409; 48 U. S. C., sec.
1345a; 49 U. S. C., sec. 12.
The various statutes from 1789 to March 4, 1923 are cited in Frankfurter
and Landis, "Criminal Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts-a Study in
Separation of Powers," 1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1087-1088. For the rele-
vant parts of the penal code see 18 U. S. C., sees. 240-243.
27 U. S. C. A., sec. 38 providing for the use of injunction and contempt
procedure in liquor cases was repealed in 1835. See 49 Stat. 872. The statute
set out in detail the method of procedure. See R. N. Golding, "Constitutional
Questions Involved in the National Prohibition Act," (1924) 19 I1. L. Rev. 71;
J. M. Olmstead, "Padlock Injunctions," (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 389; W. A.
Shumaker, "Padlock Injunctions," (1927) 30 Law Notes 185.
See for discussion of criminal contempt Hughes, Federal Practice, (1931)
vol. 9, sections 6601, 6899, 6904-6913; Longsdorf, 7 Cyclop of Federal Procedure,
(1930) sections 3705-3734, especially 3716-6913; Rapalie, Contempt, (1884);
note, "Contempt Procedure in Federal Court," Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1084-1062;
note on evidence, L. R. A. 1917B, 118; (1929) 7 Tex. L. Rev. 274; Larremore,
"Constitutional Regulation of Contempt of Court, (1900) 13 Harv. L. Rev. 80;
Barrett, "Contempt in Federal Courts," (1911) 72 Cent. L. J. 5; Fox, "The
Practice in Contempt of Court Cases, (1922) 38 L. J. Rev. 185; Frankfurter
and Landis, "Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
'Inferior' Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers," (1924) 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 1010; Fox, The History of Contempt of Court, (1927); Thomas, Prob-
lems of Contempt of Court (1934) ; Swayzee, Contempt of Court in Labor In-
junction Cases (1935) ; Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United
States, (1928) 28 Columb. L. Rev. 401, 525; Nelles, The Summary Power to
Punish for Contempt, (1931) 31 Columb. L. Rev. 956; Nelles, "A Strike and Its
Legal Consequences-An Examination of the Receivership Precedent for the
Labor Injunction, (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 507; Goodhart, "Newspapers and
Contempt of Court in English Law, (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 885; Durfee, Cases
on Equity, (1928) 147-163; Seymour, D. Thompson, "Procedure in Cases of
Criminal Contempts, (1884) 5 Crim. L. Mag. 150, 483, 647; Laski, "Procedure
for Constructive Contempt in England," (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1031; (1936)
46 Yale L. J. 326.
3 The Act was introduced on June 27, 1941 and passed the House of
Representatives on October 6, 1941, 87 Cong. Rec. 7854.-It passed the Senate
without change on November 10, 1941, 87 Cong. Rec. 8943.
4 18 U. S. C. A., sec. 688, 47 Stat. 904.
5 18 U. S. C. A., sec. 687, 54 Stat. 688.
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Inherent Power
Back in 1812 Mr. Justice William Johnson speaking for the
court distinguished between crimes and contempts on the basis that
the former necessarily rested on a statutory basis while the latter
were inherent and not necessarily derived from statutes though he
did not deny the validity of statutory regulation. He stated:
"The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime,
affix a punishment to it and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of
the offense.
"Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice
from the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state
is not among those powers. To fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, en-
force the observance of order, etc., are powers which cannot be dispensed with
in a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others; and so far
as our courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statutes;
but all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common law cases, we are of opinion,
is not within their implied powers."6
Summary power to punish for contempt is inherent, arising
from the necessity of the court for self-preservation, or of prevent-
ing obstruction of their due administration of justice.7 But the
amplitude of the summary power
"is a command never to exert it where it is not necessary or proper."8 Its great
and only purpose is to secure judicial authority from obstruction in the per-
formance of its duties."
9
Necessity gives rise only to the "least possible power adequate
to the end proposed."' 10
While Congress may regulate by statute contempt procedure in
the lower federal courts Mr. Justice Field queried whether Congress
could limit the authority of the Supreme Court, which derives its
existence and power from the Constitution." Mr. Justice Holmes
expressed the same doubt in a subsequent decision.'
2
6 United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, (1812) 7 Cranch. 32, 34, 3 L. Ed.
259, 260. See also Ex parte Grossman, (1925) 267 U. S. 87, 113, 69 L. Ed. 527,
532. For the latest statement as to the basis of federal substantive criminal law
see the concurring opinion-of Mr. Justice Jackson in D'Oench, Duhme & Co.
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., (1942) 62 Sup. Ct. 676, 684. Mr. Justice Jackson
states that because of the present tendency to constrict the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, the federal substantive criminal law is likely to continue on a
statutory basis, as early laid down, though as he points out Mr. Charles Warren
thought such view erroneous in his article, "History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789," (1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 73.
7 Ex parte Bollman, (U. S. 1807) 4 Cranch. 75, 94; Bessette v. Conkey Co.,
(1904) 194 U. S. 324, 24 Sup. Ct. 665.
8 Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 418, 451, 31 Sup.
Ct. 492, 502.
9 Ex parte Hudgings, (1919) 249 U. S. 378, 383, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 339.
10 Anderson v. Dunn (U. S. 1821) 6 Wheat. 204, 227, 5 L. Ed. 242, 248.
1 Ex parte Robinson, (1873) 19 Wall. (U. S.) 510, 22 L. Ed. 205. Compare
3 Street, Federal Equity Practice, (1909) p. 1423.
12 United States v. Shipp, (1906) 203 U. S. 563, 8 Ann. Cases 265, 27 S. Ct.
165, 21 L. Ed. 319. It is stated in Ann. Cas. 1915 D, at 1049 that the point has
never been determined.
Even the Supreme Court is subject to the free speech and press limitation
of the Constitution in the exercise of its contempt power. Bridges v. State of
California, (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190, 192.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Contempt As Sui Generis
Mr. Justice Brewer stated of contempt proceedings:
"A contempt proceeding is sui generis. It is criminal in nature, in that the
party is charged with doing something forbidden, and, if found guilty, is pun-
ished. Yet it may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and also
independeritly of any civil or criminal action."'13
He stated in the same opinion:
"It is true they are peculiar in some respects, rightfully styled sui generis.
They are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempts are
charged. No jury passes on the facts; no other court inquires into the charge."'
14
Mr. Justice McReynolds in a case involving venue stated of
contempt proceedings:
"These are sui generis,-neither civil actions nor prosecutions for offenses,
within the ordinary meaning of those terms."' 5
Later on in the same opinion he stated:
"While contempt may be an offense against the law, and subject to appro-
priate punishment, certain it is that, since the foundation of our government,
proceedings to punish such offenses have been regarded as sui generis, and
not criminal prosecutions within the 6th amendment or common under-,
standing."' 6
In a 1932 case Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in a case involving
failure by an American citizen abroad to return and testify after
being subpoenaed, ruled that contempt proceedings are "sui generis
and not 'criminal prosecutions' within the 6th Amendment or com-
mon understanding.' 1 7 Hence there would be no violation of due
process to hold the hearing and proceed to judgment in the absence
of the defendant.
Not all the protections given an accused under the Bill of
Rights apply to criminal contempt, according to Chief Justice Taft.
In a case involving the power of the President to pardon for
criminal contempt he stated:
"Contempt proceedings are sui generis because they are not hedged about
with all the safeguards provided in the Bill of Rights for protecting one accused
of ordinary crime from the danger of unjust conviction."'s
He also stated:
"The power of a court to protect itself and its usefulness by punishing
contemners is of course necessary, but it is one exercised without the restraining
influence of a jury and without many of the guaranties which the Bill of Rights
offers to protect the individual against unjust conviction."' 9
"3Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 324, 38 L. Ed. 997, 24
Sup. Ct. 665, 666.
14 194 U. S. 324, 48 L. Ed. 997, 24 Sup. Ct. 665, 670. But he went on to say
the mode of review should be as in a criminal case.
15 Myers v. United States, (1924) 264 U. S. 95, 103, 68 L. Ed. 577, 579,
44 Sup. Ct. 272.
16 264 U. S. 95, 104, 68 L. Ed. 577, 580, 44 Sup. Ct. 272.
17 Blackmer v. United States, (1932) 284 U. S. 421, 440, 52 Sup. Ct. 252,
76 L. Ed. 375, 384.
'8 Ex parte Grossman, (1925) 267 U. S. 87, 117, 69 L. Ed. 527, 534.
19 Ex parte Grossman, (1925) 267 U. S. 87, 122, 69 L. Ed. 527, 536.
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Constitutional Guaranties
A series of cases establish that the Constitution does not compel
trial by jury in criminal contempt cases.20 The right of trial by
jury in criminal cases does not cover criminal contempts. However
the Constitution does not forbid trial by jury in criminal. contempt
cases either.
21
The Debs Case raised doubt as to the validity of jury trial, or
even trial by another judge, where the contempt occurred in in-
junction proceedings. Mr. Justice Brewer stated:
"But the power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power
to punish for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question
of disobedience has been, from time immemorial, the special function of the
court. And this is no technical rule. In order that a court may compel obedi-
ence to its orders it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any
disobedience thereof. To submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal,
be it a jury or another court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of half
its efficiency."
22
Congress may regulate criminal contempt procedure in the lower
federal courts. 23 At least it may do so to the extent of providing
for trial by jury in cases where the contempt is also a "crime under
state law or federal statute."
24
The so-called criminal contempt proceeding is not in the strict
sense of the term a criminal prosecution. Hence it is not within
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which
guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall
receive a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the state and district
where the crime was committed.2 5 The district court may punish
by way of contempt for the violation of an injunction, even though
the acts constituting the contempt .were committed in another
division of the, district.
Mr. Justice Sutherland stated that the presumption of innocence
obtains, proof of guilt must be beyond reasonable doubt, and the
defendant may not be compelled to be a witness against himself in
cases of criminal contempt.26 He stated that the "fundamental
characteristics" of both crimes and criminal contempts were the
same.
2 0 Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, (1890) 134 U. S. 31; Gompers v. United
States, (1914) 233 U. S. 604, 610.21 Michaelson v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 42, 69 L. Ed. 162, 45 S. Ct.
18, noted 23 Mich. L. Rev. 516 and 9 Minn. L. Rev. 368. As to the validity of
analogous state statutes see comment by the writer (1935) 14 Neb. L. Bull. 184;
34 Mich. L. Rev. 123; 9 Temple L. G. 345; 11 Wis. L. Rev. 296.
22 Re Debs, (1895) 158 U. S. 564, 594, 39 L. Ed. 1092, 1101.
23EX parte Robinson, (1873) 19 Wall. (U. S.) 505.
24 Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Michigan and
Omaha Ry. Co., (1924) 266 U. S. 42, 66, 69 L. Ed. 162, 167; Durfee, Cases on
Equity, (1928) 154, (1935) 14 Nebraska Law Bulletin 184.
25 Myers v. United States, (1924) 264 U. S. 95, 44 S. Ct. 272, 68 L. Ed. 577.26 Michaelson v. United States ex rel.' Chicago, St. Paul, Michigan and
Omaha Ry. Co., (1924) 266 U. S. 42, 66, 69 L. Ed. 162, 167.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court has intimated that the accused in a criminal
contempt cannot be compelled to testify against himself.2 7 In
Michaelson v. United States the Court stated:
"In criminal contempts, as in criminal cases . . . the defendant may not
be compelled to be a witness against himself.
' 28
In Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Company Mr. Justice
Joseph R. Lamar stated:
"In another most important particular the parties clearly indicated that
they regarded this as a civil proceeding. The complainant made each of the
defendants a witness for the company, and as such each was required to testify
against himself-a thing that most likely would not have been done or suffered
if either party had regarded this as a proceeding at law for criminal contempt,
because the provision of the Constitution that 'no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,' is applicable not only to
crimes, but also to quasi-criminal and penal proceedings. ' 29
Freedom from self-incrimination in contempt proceedings is
possibly to be implied from the statement of Mr. Justice Bradley
in a case where a lawyer was disbarred for criminal contempt in
taking part in a lynching near the federal court:
"The charge was specific, due notice of it was given, a reasonable time set
for the hearing, and the petitioner was not required to criminate himself by
answering under oath."30
The court said that the due process provision of the Fifth Amend-
ment was not violated.
3'
Freedom from self-incrimination is perhaps hinted at in the
language of Mr. Justice Bradley in a case involving an action for
penalties and forfeitures:
"As therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures, incurred by the commis-
sion of offenses against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think
27 Gompers v. United States, (1911) 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. Ed. 797, 31 Sup.
Ct. 492; Michaelson v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 42, 69 L. Ed. 162, 45
Sup. Ct. 18.
In Merchants' Stock and Grain Co., (C. C. A. 20, 28) 201 Fed. 20, Judge
W. H. Sanborn asserted that the practice of putting interrogatories was incon-
sistent with the guaranty against compulsory self-incrimination in the Fifth
Amendment. There was a dissent by Hook, J. See also Longsdorf, Cyclopedia
of Federal Procedure, Volume 7, (1929) see. 3727, p. 782; Curtis and Curtis,
"The Story of a Motion in the Law of Criminal Contempt," (1927) 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 51, 60-63, 67-68; Merrick, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
as to Charges of Contempt"; (1919) 14 Ill. L. Rev. 181; (1937) 15 Nebraska
Law Bull. 387; Note (1927) 54 A. L. R., 1436; L. R. A. 1914B, 118; Wigmore,
Evidence, par. 2257 (3).
28 Michaelson v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 42, 58, 69 L. Ed. 162, 45
Sup. Ct. 18.
29 Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., (191) 221 U. S. 418, 447, 55 L. Ed.
797, 808, 31 Sup. Ct. 492. Professor Durfee says that the "authorities contra
suggest two distinctions (1) between answers to interrogatories propounded
in accordance with the ancient practice in contempt cases, and oral examination
in open court, (2) between testimony as to guilt of the contempt and testimony
implicating defendant in a crime, in the proper sense." Durfee, Cases on Equity,
(1928), 157, n. 13.3 0 Ex parte Wall, (1883) 107 U. S., 265, 271, 27 L. Ed. 552, 556 (mandamus
disallowed to compel judge to reverse order of disbarment). Field, J. dissented
on the ground that an attorney should not be disbarred for an offense not
connected with his professional conduct, prior to a criminal prosecution.
31 107 U. S. 265, 288, 27 L. Ed. 552, 562.
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that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that portion of the Fifth Amend-
ment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."32
SIMILARITY OF CONTEMPT TO CRIME
Mr. Justice Joseph R. Lamar stated that
"it is certain in proceedings for criminal contempt the defendant is presumed to
be innocent" and that "he must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
33
When an act happens to be both a contempt and a crime, it may
be punished both by indictment and by contempt proceedings.3 4
Section 25 of the Clayton Act expressly declares
"nor shall any such proceeding be a bar to any criminal prosecution for tie
same act or acts."3 5
Criminal contempts are treated as crimes within the federal
statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions.3 6 The fact that
there is no constitutional right of trial by jury is immaterial. It
is also immaterial that there is no indictment or information. Mr.
Justice Holmes stated:
"If such acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most fundamental
characteristic of crimes as that word has been understood in English speech."
He further pointed out that in early English law they were punished
only by the usual criminal procedure, and that they still may be
and preferably are tried in that way. Even if the statute of limita-
tions did not expressly cover criminal contempts, the Supreme
Court would apply it by way of analogy.
An information brought by the government for punishment of
criminal contempt in violation of an injunction is a "criminal case"
with the Criminal Appeals Act,3 7 permitting the government to
appeal in certain criminal cases.38 The court by Mr. Justice
Sanford also pointed out that criminal contempts are "offenses
against the United States" within the statute of limitations applic-
able thereto, and are pardonable by the President under Article 2
of the Constitution. He stated:
"The only substantial difference between such a proceeding for criminal
3 2 Boyd v. United States, (1886) 116 U. S. 616, 634, 29 L. Ed. 746, 752, 6
S. Ct.. 524.
33 ompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., (1910) 221 U. S. 418, 444. 55
L. Ed. 797, 807. Professor Durfee in his Cases on Equity, (1928) 157, note 13,
says that the authorities are in conflict, citing Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.
1923), sec. 2498 (2) ; L. R. A. 1917 B, 118, 123.
34 Ex parte Savin, (1889) 131 U. S. 267,' 33 L. Ed. 150, 9 Sup. Ct. 699.
35 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 390.
36 Gompers v. United States, (1914) 233 U. S. 604, 58 L. Ed. 1115, Van
Devanter and Pitney, J. J., dissenting. The contempt consisted of violation of
a labor injunction. See (1937) 15 Nebraska Law Bulletin 387.
37 18 U. S. C. A., section 682.
36 United States v. Goldman, (1928) 277U. S. 229, 72 L. Ed. 862, 48 Sup. Ct.
486, 487.
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contempt and a criminal prosecution is that in the one the act complained of
is the violation of a decree and in the other the violation of a law."'
' 9
Direct Contempt and Summary Procedure
The clearest case of criminal contempt is actual disturbance
made in the court room itself which interferes with the process of
litigation. An example is Terry's contempt in the Hill divorce
case. 40 While that case was being tried in a United States circuit
court, the libellant, Sarah Terry, was guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of the court which thereupon ordered that she be removed
by the marshal. Her husband, a member of the bar, assaulted and
beat the marshal to prevent his executing the court's order. This
was done in open court in the presence of the judges. Summary
punishment of six months imprisonment was administered even
though the contemner had left the room and gone into a nearby
room in the same building.41 In another case42 the defendant
together with various other persons riotously took from a jail a
person charged with a crime during an intermission of the court
which was trying him, and hanged him from the limb of a tree
immediately in front of the court house door through which the
judge passed on his way into court after the intermission. The
act was not only unlawful but insulting to the court. As the Supreme
Court said, it was perpetrated with audacious effrontery in the
virtual presence of the court. The power of the court extends to
contemptuous conduct in any part of the building which is set aside
for the use of the court and its officers, and the grand and petit
juries.
43
In a dissenting opinion Justice Lucius Q. C. Lamar and Chief
Justice Fuller asserted that an assault upon a member of the
Supreme Court while he is on a train is not a contempt of court
committed in the presence of the court.
44
39 277 U. S. 229, 72 L. Ed. 862, 48 Sup. Ct. 486, 487. He also ruled, however,
that the venue provision of the Sixth Amendment did not apply to criminal
contempt involving violation of an injunction.
40EX parte Terry, (1888) 128 U. S. 289, 9 Sup. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed. 405
(application for habeas corpus in Supreme Court). Such contempts have been
referred to as direct contempts. C. H. Thomas, Problems of Contempt of Court,
(1934) 3. Even here one writer would prefer a criminal prosecution by indict-
ment. Nelles, "The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt," (1931) 31
Columb. L. Rev. 956, 964-965.
41 The court expressly refused to decide on the issue of the right to punish
summarily for direct contempt at a subsequent term of court, or a subsequent
day of the same term of court. Ex parte Terry, (1888) 128 U. S. 289, 314,
9 Sup. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed. 405, 412.
42 Ex parte Wall, (1883) 107 U. S. 265, 27 L. Ed. 552.
43 Savin, Petitioner, (1809) 131 U. S. 261, 9 Sup. Ct. 699, (bribery of jury).
The penalty was one year imprisonment. There was a pardon by the president.
In Cuddy, Petitioner, (1889) 131 U. S. 280, 9 Sup. Ct. 703, the record being
silent, it was assumed that an attempt to influence a juror was made in the
presence of the court.
4Cunningham v. Neagle, (1890) 135 U. S. 1, 77, 97, 34 L. Ed. 55, 76, 83, 10
Sup. Ct. 658. "Great as the crime of Terry was in his assault upon Mr. Justice
Field, so far from its being a crime against the court, it was not even a con-
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Mr. Justice Stone in a dissenting opinion suggested that the
whole court were probably in accord that the
"surreptitious tampering with witnesses, jurors or parties in the presence of
the court, although unknown to it, would be summarily punishable because in
its presence."4 5
He also stated:
"I do not understand my brethren to maintain that the secret bribery or
intimidation of a witness in the court room may not be summarily punished." 46
Mr. Chief Justice White thus describes the constitutional limita-
tions or lack of limitations on federal contempt procedure:
"Existing within the limits of and sanctioned by the Constitution, the power
to punish for contempt committed in the presence of the court is not controlled
by the limitations of the Constitution as to modes of accusation and methods
of trial generally safeguarding the rights of the citizen."
4 7
In the case of summary contempt procedure no evidence need
be presented.48 There is no right to assistance of counsel. There
is no right of trial nor issue to try. There is no right to a hearing
and the contemner cannot offer an explanation of his motives. The
court may proceed to fix the punishment immediately without notice
to the contemner.
Procedure for the prosecution of a direct contempt is very
summary.49 The contemner may be jailed without a hearing and
without being given an opportunity to defend himself. There is no
necessity for affidavit, notice, or other process.50 The court may
order the bailiff to attach the contemner and bring him before the
bar of the court. The court may then immediately pass sentence,
and may either fine or imprison the contemner.5 1
Where an accused found guilty of contempt and sentenced
to imprisonment seeks release by writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that the contempt was not committed in the presence of the
court, the writ may be refused where the record does not show that
the contempt occurred out of the presence of the court but is
silent concerning the matter, the petition for the writ is also silent,
and no evidence is offered to the contrary.
52
tempt of court, and could not have received adequate punishment as such. Sec-
tion 725 of the Revised Statutes limits contempt to cases of misbehavior in
the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
of justice."
See Milton Green, "In re Neagle-A Study in Judicial Motivation," (1941-
1942) 14 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 29, 86.
45 Nye v. United States, (1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 817, 818. Compare (1935)
28 I1. L. Rev. 970.
46 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 817, 819.
47 Ex parte Hudgings, (1919) 249 U. S. 378, 383, 63 L. Ed. 656, 658.
48 Cooke v. United States, (1924) 265 U. S. 517, 534, 69 L. Ed. 757, 773;
Ex parte Terry, (1888) 128 U. S. 289, 32 L. Ed. 405, 9 Sup. Ct. 77.
40 C. H. Thomas, "Problems of Contempt of Court," (1934) 4; (1929) 7
Tex L. Rev. 274, 277 (1935) 28 I1. L. Rev. 970.
50 13 C. J. 63; Durfee, Cases on Equity, (1928) 152, note 4.
51 Ex parte Terry (1888) 128 U. S. 289, 32 L. Ed. 405.
52 Ex parte Cuddy, (1889) 131 U. S. 280, 33 L. Ed. 154.
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Forms of Contempt
Even the most serious kind of a crime may be punishable as
contempt. In one case the Supreme Court considered as a contempt
the lynching of a negro after an appeal had been taken to that court
from a conviction of rape. 53 An attempt to influence the verdict
of a jury by bribery is punishable, one year's imprisonment being
imposed in one case.5 4 Shadowing of the jury has been treated as
contempt.55
The Supreme Court has stated, however, that
"of course, a proceeding in contempt cannot be considered as an infamous
crime."56
Not all forms of perjury amount to contempt. The perjury must
be shown to be obstructive of justice.57 Mr. Chief Justice White
stated:
"In order to punish perjury in the presence of the court as a contempt
there must be added to the essential elements of perjury under the general
law the further element of obstruction to the court in the performance of its
duty. It is true that there are decided cases which treat perjury, without any
other element, as adequate to sustain a punishment for contempt. But the
mistake is, we think, evident, since it either overlooks or misconceives the
essential characteristic of the obstructive tendency underlying the contempt
power, or mistakenly attributes a necessarily obstructive effect to false
swearing."58
Concealment or misstatement by a juror upon a voir dir exami-
nation is punishable as a contempt if its tendency and design are
to obstruct the processes of justice.59 It is immaterial that one of
the aggravations of such contempt is the commission of perjury.
53 United States v. Shipp, (1906) 293 U. S. 563, 214 U. S. 386, (1909) 214
U. S. 439, 215 U. S. 586. (original jurisdiction).
54 In -re Savin, (1889) 131 U. S. 261, 33 L. Ed. 150, 9 Sup. Ct. 699. (attempt
to bribe witness.)
Six months imprisonment was imposed in Cuddy, Petitioner, (1889) 131
U. S. 280, 9 Sup. Ct. 703. (Attempt to influence prospective juror in case
pending.)
55 Sinclair v. United States, (1929) 279 U. S. 749, 49 Sup. Ct. 471, 73 L. Ed.
938, noted 28 Mich. L. Rev. 199.
58 Bessette v. Conkey Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 325, 335, 48 L. Ed. 997, 1005.
&7 The wisdom of summary contempt prosecution is doubted in Nelles, "The
Summary Power to Punish for Contempt," (1931) 31 Columb. L. Rev. 956,
969-970.
That perjury may be a direct contempt and therefore summarily punishable
is asserted in (1935) 28 Il. L. Rev. 970, 972.
58Ex parte Hudgings, (1919) 249 U. S. 378, 383, 39 Sup. Ct. 337. The court
asserted there was no jurisdiction and a writ of habeas corpus was granted.
He went on to point out the danger of too sweeping a use of contempt procedure
for perjury:
"When a court entertained the opinion that a witness was testifying un-
truthfully the power would result to impose a punishment for contempt with the
object or purpose of exacting from the witness a character of testimony which
the court would deem to be truthful, and thus it would come to pass that a
potentiality of oppression and wrong would result and the freedom of the
citizen when called as a witness in a court would be gravely impaired."
59 Clark v. United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 1, 53 S. Ct. 465, 77 L. Ed. 993,
noted 31 Mich. L. Rev. 850; 17 Minn. L. Rev. 654; 81 U: Pa. L. Rev. 1000; 8
Wis. L. Rev. 371. The court also stated that deceit by an attorney might be
punished as a contempt if the deceit was an abuse of the function of his office.
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A talesman when accepted as a juror becomes a part or member of
the court. More may thus be required of him than of a witness.
The privileges from disclosure of the deliberations of the jury
will not apply.
60
It is proper to punish for contempt witnesses summoned to
testify before a federal grand jury who, alleging the invalidity of
the statutes under which the grand jury's investigation is con-
ducted and the consequent war of jurisdiction of court or jury
over the subject-matter, refuse to testify.6 1 He may not urge ob-
jections of incompetency or irrelevancy such as a party might raise,
for this is no concern of his. They may be remanded to the custody
of the marshal until they comply, and habeas corpus will not be
available to release them. Under the Fifth Amendment and the
statute relating to the organization of the grand jury there is a
duty to testify.
The Act of July 31, 1936,62 providing for the subpoenaing in a
foreign country, upon service by an American consul of a citizen
of the United States whose presence in a criminal prosecution in a
federal court was desired, does not violate the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment.6 3 If the citizen disobeys this statute in
the foreign country, he is punishable by a federal court. There is
no violation of international law. He may be punished for con-
tempt of court even though he is not present here if suitable notice
and opportunity to appear and be heard are given, by the seizure
of his property to satisfy a fine. This does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The fact that only the prosecutor may subpoena may
not be challenged by a recalcitrant witness as violating the provi-
sion of the Sixth Amendment that an accused shall have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
If a trial orders a district attorney to return to the owner
certain books and papers seized in violation of his constitutional
rights and he refuses to do so he may be committed for contempt,
and no writ of error will lie to the Supreme Court to review the
order committing for contempt.6 4
In a case coming up from the District of Columbia it was held
289 U. S. 1, 12. 77 L. Ed. 993, 999.
The contempt hearing in this case was before a district court of two judges.
289 U. S. 1, 9, 77 L. Ed. 993, 997. The original trial was held before a third
judge.
For comments on this aspect of the case see 3 Idaho L. J. 259; (June 1933)
21 Ill. B. J. 26, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 292; 24 J. Crim. L. 446; 17 Marq. L. Rev. 300;
17 Minn. L. Rev. 299, 340, 654; 11 N. C. L. Rev. 347; 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000.
60 Clark v. U. S., (1933) 289 U. S. 1 at 12.
61 Blair v. United States, (1919) 250 U. S. 273, 39 Sup. Ct. 468, 63 L. Ed. 979.
62 Chap. 762, 44 Stat. Cit. L. 35; 28 U. S. C. A., sections 711-718.
63 Blackmer v. United States, (1932) 284 U. S. 421, 52 S. Ct. 252, 76 L. Ed.
375, noted 30 Columb. L. Rev. 747, 17 Corn. L. Q. 117, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 132,
2 Idaho L. J. 211, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 137 and 968, 6 So. Calif. L. Rev. 60, 17 St.
Louis L. Rev. 85 and 274, 65 U. S. L. Rev. 640.
64 Wise v. Mills, (1911) 229 U. S. 549, 55 L. Ed. 31 S. Ct. 597.
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that the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia had no jurisdic-
tion to disbar an attorney for a contempt committed before another
court, namely, the Criminal Court of the District.65 Such court
could not punish him upon an ex parte proceeding without notice
or opportunity of defense, or explanation of misbehavior. Mandamus
would therefore lie from the United States Supreme Court.
The Act of 1789 prescribing fine or imprisonment as the penalty
for contempt does not authorize disbarment of a contemner who
happens to be a lawyei.16 The Act negates all other methods of
punishment.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, while a professor of law thus defined
contempt in an article on criminal contempt:
"The particular aspect of 'inherent power' of the inferior Federal courts
with which we are dealing concerns their incidental capacity to remove obstruc-
tions to the discharge of their work. The conventional description of such
obstruction is contempt, and the mode of dealing with it is characterized as the
power of courts to punish for contempt.
' 6 7
Distinction Between Criminal and Civil Contempt
The difference between criminal and civil contempt is rather
vague and uncertain.68 This may be seen in the numerous proceed-
ings against Samuel Gompers for disobeying an injunction issued
on behalf of the Bucks Stove and Range Company. The Supreme
Court reversed a conviction for civil contempt. 69 There was then a
trial for criminal contempt which also was taken up for review by
the Supreme Court.70 That Court reversed upon the ground that
prosecution had been outlawed by, or by the policy of the criminal
statute of limitations.
Perhaps the classic statement of the difference between criminal
and civil contempt is that by Mr. Justice Brewer:
"Proceedings for contempts are of two classes, those prosecuted to preserve
the power and vindicate the dignity of the courts and to punish for disobedience
of their orders, and those instituted to preserve and enforce rights of private
parties to suits, and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made to enforce
65 Ex parte Bradley, (1869) 7 Wall. (U. S.) 365, 19 L. Ed. 214, Miller, J.
dissenting.
66 Ex parte Robinson, (1874) 19 Wall. (U. S.) 505, 512, 22 L. Ed. 205, 208,
opinion by Field, J. The Act of 1831 is to the same effect.
87 Frankfurter and Landis, "Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers,"
(1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1023.
68 For a general discussion of the distinction see Beale, "Contempt of Court,
Criminal and Civil," (1908) 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161; note (1912) 25 Harv. L. Rev.
375; (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (1924) 24 Columb. L. Rev. 921; Schofield,
(1913) 8 Ill. L. Rev. 210; (1921) 5 Minn. L. Rev. 459; (1934) 20 Iowa L. Rev.
121; Chafee and Simpson, Cases on Equity (1934) 54-57; Ann. Cas. 1915D,
1048; Chafee, Cases on Equitable Relief Against Torts, (1924) 491-498; 13
L. R. A. (n. s.) 591; 34 L. R. A. (n. s.) 874; 42 L. R. A. (n. s.) 794; 21 Ann. Cas.
907; (1936) 46 Yale L. J. 326.
69 Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Company, (1910) 221 U. S. 419, 30
Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 791. See discussion in Nelles, "The Summary Power to
Punish for Contempt," (1931) 31 Columb. L. Rev. 956, 961-962. See H. S.
Schofield, (1913) 8 Ill. L. Rev. 210.
70 Gompers v. United States, (1914) 233 U. S. 604, 34 Sup. Ct. 693, 58 L. Ed.
1115.
LESTER B. ORFIELD
the rights and administer the remedies to which the court has found them to
be entitled. The former are criminal and punitive in their nature, and the
government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. The
latter are civil, remedial and coercive in their nature, and the parties chiefly in
interest in their conduct and prosecution are the individuals whose private
rights and remedies they were instituted to protect or enfore. '" 71
Mr. Justice Joseph R. Lamar stated:
"Contempts are neither wholly civil not altogether criminal. ' ' 72 He also
stated. "It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose,
that often serves to distinguish between the two classes of cases.
s73
A possible implication, though the court does not say it directly
is that where the party refuses to do what he is ordered to do the
contempt is civil, and that where he does what he is forbidden to
do it is criminal.
74
In 1939 Mr. Justice Black stated:
"While particular acts do not always readily lend themselves to classification
as civil or criminal contempts, a contempt is considered civil when the punish-
ment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is
not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public."75
It seems to have been held that where a defendant not a party
to an injunction suit violated a temporary restraining order of a
federal court such contempt was criminal and not civil since the
Supreme Court called for review by writ of error as in criminal
cases.7 6 The defendant's act was in resistance of the order of the
court and therefore came more fully within the punitive than the
remedial class.
A contempt may be criminal even though under a statute the
fine is to be paid to the United States or to the complainant or
divided among the parties injured by the act as the court may
direct.77 This is true where the discretion given to the court is
incidental to the dominating purpose of the proceeding, which is
punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court and punish the act
of disobedience as a public wrong.
71 Bessette v. Conkey Co., (1903) 194 U. S. 324, 328, 48 L. Ed. 997, 1002, 24
Sup. Ct. 665, 666. The court was quoting the view of Judge Walter H. Sanborn,
Re Nevitt, (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) 117 Fed. 448, 458, 54 C. C. A. 622, 632.
72 Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., (1910) 221 U. S. 418, 441, 55
L. Ed. 797, 806, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 34 L. R. A. (n. s.) 874.
73 221 U. S. 418, 441, 55 L. Ed. 797, 806.
i4 (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 617; (1921) 5 Minn. L. Rev. 461. But it has been
pointed out that punishment which on its face seems purely punitive may in fact
be coercive. Beale, "Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil," (1907) 21 Harv.
L. Rev. 161, 170; (1921) 5 Minn. L. Rev. 461, 463.
75 McCrone v. United States, (1939) 307 U. S. 61, 64; 58 Sup. Ct. 685, 686.
In this case it was held that a failure to obey a district court order to testify
before an internal revenue official was a civil contempt, involving simply
procedure for the collection of taxes and not being in "vindication of the public
justice." Hence on appeal, the statutory rules of civil appeals, with respect to
the time for taking an appeal, applied.76 Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 324, 48 L. Ed. 997, 24 Sup.
Ct. 665; Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, volume 7,
(1929) section 3711, p. 758.
7 7 Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Michigan and
Omaha Ry. Co., (1924) 266 U. S. 42, 65, 69 L. Ed. 162, 167.
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An example of a civil contempt, though not so stated in the
opinion, is a case where the contemner had been perpetually en-
joined from setting up any claim or title to any of the bonds which
were the subject-matter of the suit, and disobeyed such injunction
by setting up claim of title to certain of the bonds mentioned in the
decree. He was sentenced to a fine of $250 and costs, and committed
to the custody of the marshal of the Supreme Court until said fine
and costs were paid.78 The court stated that punishments for con-
tempt of court have two aspects: (1) to vindicate the dignity of
the court from disrespect shown to its orders; and (2) to compel
the performance of some order or decree of the court which it is
in the power of the party to perform and which he refuses to obey.
79
A proceeding to punish an attorney for contempt in filing con-
veyances of property from his client to himself pending a suit to
set aside as fraudulent to judgment creditors, conveyances of the
same property to other persons is civil in its nature, even though
the acts of the attorney might take the characteristics of both a
civil and a criminal contempt.8 0 The prayer of the petition for
relief declaring that its purpose was to secure restoration of the
directed property in order to carry out the decree in the principal
suit is determinative.
One of the latest cases to discuss the difference between criminal
and civil contempt is Nye v. United States.81 It was there stated
that the contempt is civil when the punishment is wholly remedial,
serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as
a deterrent to offenses against the public. For purposes of review,
where a fine is imposed on a person adjudged guilty of contempt,
partly as compensation to the complainant and partly as punish-
ment, the criminal feature of the order is dominant and fixes its
character . 2 It is not controlling that in the district court the con-
tempt proceedings were entitled in a wrongful death action, and
that the United States was not a party until the appeal.8 3 The
prayer for relief and the acts charged may indicate the criminal
character.8 4 The fact that the contemner is not a party to a princi-
pal civil action points to the criminal character.8 5
78 In re Chiles, (1875) 22 Wall. (U. S.) 157, 169, 22 L. Ed. 819, 823.
79 In re Chiles, (1875) 22 Wall. (U. S. 157, 168, 22 L. Ed. 819, 823.
80 Lamb v. Cramer, (1932) 285, U. S. 317, 220, 52 S. Ct. 315, 76 L. Ed. 715,
719.
81 Nye v. United States, (1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 810. The court cited McCrone v.
United States, (1939) 307 U. S. 61, 64, 59, S. Ct. 685, 686, 83 L. Ed. 1108.
82 The court cited Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, (1922) 259 U. S. 107, 110, 42
S. Ct. 427, 428, 66 L. Ed. 848.
83 The court cited Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., (1911) 221 U. S.
418, 445, 31 S. Ct. 492, 499, 500, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (n. s.) 874.84 The court cited Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., (1911) 221 U. S.
418, 449, 31 S. Ct. 492, 501, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (n.'s.) 874.
85 The court cited Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 324, 329,
24 S. Ct. 665, 667, 48 L. Ed. 997.
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The Act of 1831
The Act of 1789 did not define contempts nor prescribe any
procedure. Mr. Justice Harlan states:
"The Act of 1789 did not define what were contempts of the authority of the
courts of the United States, in any case or hearing before them, nor did it
prescribe any special procedure for determining a matter of contempt. Under
that statute the question whether particular acts constituted a contempt, as
well as the mode of proceeding against the offender, was left to be determined
according to such established rules and principles of the common law as were
applicable to such situation."8 6
Section 268 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A., section 385
provides:
"The said courts shall have power to impose and administer all necessary
oaths, and to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court,
contempts of their authority. Such power to punish contempts shall not be
construed to extend to any cases except for misbehavior of any person in their
presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the
misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in their official transactions,
and the disobedience or resistance by any such officer, or any party, juror,
witness, or other person to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command of the said courts."
This section was enacted into law in 1831. sT The Act of 178988
provided that courts of the United States
"shall have power . . . to punish by fine or imprisonment .. . all contempts
of authority in any cause or hearing before the same."
Abuses of this undefined power to punish for contempt resulted
in the House of Representatives instructing its Judiciary -Com-
mittee
"to inquire into the expediency of defining, by statute, all offenses which may
be punishable as contempts of the courts of the United States, and also to
limit the punishment of the same."8 9
The upshot was the 'Act of 1831, of Which Section 1, the present
28 U. S. C. A., sec. 385, restricted the powers of summary punish-
ment for contempts of court to cases of
"misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of said courts, or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."
Section 2 of the 1831 act, from which 18 U. S. C. A. sec 241 or
Section 135 of the Criminal Code derives, provided that any person
attempting by threats, force, or corruption, to obstruct the due
86 Ex parte Savin, (1889) 131 U. S. 267, 275, 33 L. Ed. 150, 152.
87 4 Stat. 487 (1831). For the history of the act see Frankfurter and Landis,
"Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal
Courts-A Study in Separation of Power (1924)." 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1024.
88 Section 17 of the Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 83. It was held that Section 17
enacted "a limitation upon the manner in which the power shall be exercised
and must be held to be a negation of all other modes of punishment." Ex parte
Robinson (1873) 19 Wall. (U. S.) 505, 512.
89 7 Cong. Deb. 560 (1931). See also House Journal, 21st Cong. 2d Sess.
(1831) 245. The courts themselves recognized the possibility of abuse under
the undefined power. Ex parte Kearney, (1822) 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 38, 45;
Craig v. Hecht, (1923) 263 U. S. 255, 279; Ex parte Wall. (1882) 107 U. S.
265, 302.
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administration of justice "shall be liable to prosecution therefor,
by indictment." The Supreme Court has indicated that although
an act punishable under section 2 could also be a contempt if com-
mitted in the presence of the court, the primary purpose of section
2 was to create a separate category of offenses involving trial by
jury.
90
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Act of 1831 in 1874.
Referring to the lower federal courts it said
"... the power of these courts in the punishment of contempts can only be
exercised to insure order and decorum in their presence, to secure faithfulness
on the part of their officers in their official transactions, and to enforce obedi-
ence to their lawful orders, judgments and processes. 91
In 1889 the Court upheld a conviction for contempt for attempts
to bribe a witness in the hallway of the courtroom. 92 The court
overruled the view of a lower court case 3 that section 2 of the
statute was meant to apply to acts no longer summarily punishable
as contempts, and substituted the construction of section 2 as an
alternative procedure if the behavior was in the "presence" of
the court.
It was not until 1918 that the Court found that 28 U. S. C. A.,
sec. 385 "conferred no power not already granted and enforced
no limitations not already existing. ' 94 The Court upheld the dis-
trict court in holding in contempt a newspaper editor who had
printed editorials containing misleading remarks and cartoons in-
jurious to the dignity of the court. This result was arrived at by
interpreting the phrase "so near thereto" in a causal relation sense
rather than as a matter of geographical nearness. By this doctrine
the federal criminal contempt power was held not limited to those
acts occurring in the vicinity of the court, but to extend to acts
which have a "reasonable tendency" to "obstruct the administration
of justice."
In the latest case, through one coming up from the state courts,
the Supreme Court by a five to four decision reversed judgments of
90 Nye v. United States, (1941) 313 U. S. 33. A writer has suggested the
following explanation for the adoption of section 2: (1) to provide an alterna-
tive method for the trial of some of the more serious acts of contempt to save
the courts having to sit in judgment of their own cases and permitting them
to shift the burden to a jury; (2) to provide proceedings for acts formerly
punishable summarily by contempt, but now freed from such punishment
under section 1 of the Act. Thomas, Problems of Contempt of Court, (1934) 56.
Compare Nelles and King, "Contempt by Publication in the United States,"
(1928) 28 Columb. L. Rev. 525, 530.
91 Ex parte Robinson, (1874) 86 U. S. 505. This case also upholds the power
- of Congress to regulate the lower federal courts in the punishment of contempts.
92 Savin, Petitioner, (1889) 131 U. S. 267, 33 L. Ed. 150, 9 Sup. Ct. 699.
Accord: Cuddy, Petitioner, (1889) 131 U. S. 280; 9 Sup. Ct. 703.
93 Ex parte Poulson, (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1835) 19 Fed. Cas. 1205, No. 11, 350.
9- Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, (1918) 247 U. S. 402. Only five
justices concurred in this opinion. Two justices took no part and two-Holmes
and Brandeis-dissented.
The case is criticized in Frankfurter and Landis, (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev.
1010, 1029-1037; Nelles and King, "Contempt by Publication in the United
States," (1928) 28 Columb. L. Rev. 525, 540.
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conviction for contempt of state courts based upon publications in
newspapers of comments relating to pending litigation.9 5 The
court applied to publications not the "reasonable tendency test"
but "clear and present danger" test:
"that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of immi-
nence extremely high before utterances can be punished."9 6
The First Amendment, applicable to the state through the
Fourteenth Amendment, was intended to give to liberty of the
press "the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly
society." The court stated by Mr. Justice Black that in deciding
whether the contempt power in publication cases was forbidden by
the "sweeping constitutional mandate" against any law abridging
the freedom of the press the Court was "necessarily measuring a
power of all American courts, both state and federal," including
the Supreme Court itself. The court expressly declined to pass on
the situation if there were a statute increasing the power of the
court to punish for contempt in cases of constructive contempt. The
whole court agrees that contempt by publication may still exist
after their decision. The whole court agrees that there can be no
contempt where the publication occurs after the final decision of
the case.
A letter written by an attorney to a federal district judge con-
demning the judge in a pending case was held not a contempt com-
mitted "in open court. '97 It therefore could not be punished
summarily. The court agreed with an earlier case that the statu-
tory phrase "in open court" was narrower in meaning than the
phrase "in the presence of the court. s9 8  Summary punishment
might not be possible as to the latter in some cases.
The latest significant case interpreting this section is Nye v.
United States decided in 1941. This case directly overrules the
"reasonable tendency" doctrine laid down in Toledo Newspaper
Company v. United States.9 9 It limits a good deal the summary
contempt power invoked by federal judges in applying that doc-
95 Bridges v. State of California, (1941) 62 Sup. Ct. 190. The question was
left undecided in Patterson v. Colorado, (1907) 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560.
For discussion see Hansen, "The Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press and
Contempt by Publication," (1942) 27 Corn. L. Q. 165; Radin, Freedom of
Speech and Contempt of Court, (1942) 36 Ill. L. Rev. 599; 15 So. Calif. L. Rev.
367; 26 Minn. L. Rev. 552.
96 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 194.
9 Cooke v. United States, (1925) 267 U .S. 517, 69 L. Ed. 767.
98 Re Savin, (1889) 131 U. S. 267, 33 L. Ed. 150, 9 Sup. Ct. 699.
99 Nye v. United States, (1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 810, Hughes, C. J., Stone and
Roberts, J. J., dissenting, noted 54 Herv. L. Rev. 1397; 19 N. C. L. Rev. 219;
20 N. C. L. Rev. 89; 1 Bill of Rights Rev. 303, 312; 21 Boston U. L. Rev. 546; 16
Temple L. Q. 94; 90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 104; 27 Va. L. Rev. 665, 1093; 26 Wash. U.
L. Q. 566.
However even after this case there may be contempt though no physical
disturbance is involved. (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1397, 1398; Savin, Petitioner
(1889) 131 U. S. 267 (witness approached in witness room and hallway);
Cuddy, Petitioner, (1889) 131 U. S. 280 (juror approached); Sinclair v. United
States (1929) 279 U. S. 749 (juror shadowed near court room).
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trine. The facts of Nye v. United States were as follows: The
defendant attempted through the use of alcohol and persuasion to
induce one Elmore, a person illiterate and enfeebled in mind and
body, to terminate a suit brought by him for the death of his son.
Such misconduct occurred more than one hundred miles from the
location of the district court. On motion of the attorney for Elmore,
the court issued a show cause order to the defendants, who, after
a hearing were adjudged guilty of contempt for "misbehavior so
near to the presence of the court as to obstruct justice." The Su-
preme Court reversed on the ground that the district court did not
have the power to punish defendants for contempt because of this
behavior, since the place of misconduct on hundred miles away was
not so near the court as to obstruct the administration of justice.
It refused to interpret the phrase "so near thereto" in a causal
relation sense. It gave a literal meaning to the phrase by reading
it in relation to the word "presence" and by demanding physical
proximity to the court.
Seemingly the statute does not limit the use of the contempt
power to cases of actual physical disturbance. The Court cited
with approval an earlier case'00 holding that the contempt power
was available to punish for any misbehavior whether there was
any physical disturbance or not if committed "in" or "near" the
"presence" of the court. The dissent criticized this position by
questioning any difference between secret bribery of a witness in
the court room and the same bribery one hundred miles away.
The result of this decision is that the federal courts may not
punish summarily by contempt proceedings for defamatory publi-
cation. Summary jurisdiction -for this purpose has been the chief
bone of contention in the entire law of criminal contempt since it
is at this point that the personality of the individual judge is most
likely to become involved.' 10 Hereafter it will be necessary to prose-
cute for defamatory publication by indictment under Section 135
of the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 241. Thus this right of
free speech is safeguarded. However, the majority opinion goes
beyond this and prohibits summary punishment in other cases
where no such danger of personal bias is present. Whether that
be desirable as a matter of policy or not the Court stated that it
"gave full respect to the meaning which Congress unmistakably
intended the statute to have." If the contempt power is to be ex-
panded, it is a matter for Congress to deal with.
The early contempt cases were centered around the problem of
publication as contempt. In recent years the bone of contention
100 Savin, Petitioner, (1889) 131 U. S. 267, (attempt to bribe a witness in the
hallway of the courtroom).
10, Nelles and King, "Contempt by Publication in the United States," (1928)
28 Columb. L. Rev. 401, continued at 525; (1941) 36 I1. L. Rev. 471, 474;
Goodhart, "Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law," (1935) 48
Harv. L. Rev. 885. See also Sullivan, Contempts by Publication, (1940).
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has been the use of contempt procedure to enforce injunctions, par-
ticularly labor injunctions. The primary objective of law reformers
has been to secure the right of trial by jury.
In 1890 Congress passed an act allowing federal officials to go
into the federal courts to obtain injunctions restraining the com-
mission of conspiracies which threaten to obstruct interstate com-
merce. 10 2 In 1894 suit was filed to restrain the unlawful acts of
certain strikers and labor leaders. The restraining order was
violated and Debs was adjudged guilty of contempt and given a jail
term of three to six months.10 3
The Clayton Act of 1914 provided in the special class of criminal
contempts "within the purview" of that Act that the trial of such
contempts
"may be by the court, or upon the demand of the accused by a jury . .. and
such trial shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice in criminal cases
prosecuted by indictment or upon information."104
But the act specifically leaves for summary treatment those
cases which "involve the characteristics upon which the power to
punish for contempt must rest," namely obstructions
"to the performance of judicial duty resulting from an act done in the presence
of the court."o5
The special class of cases under the Clayton Act for which the
procedure of jury trial is permitted, is confined to acts which
"constitute also a criminal offense under any statute of the United States, or
under the laws of any state in which the act was committed."10 6
The jury trial provision is constitutional. However the court
pointed out in connection with the Act:
"It is of narrow scope, dealing with a single class where the act or thing
constituting the contempt is also a crime in the ordinary sense."1 7
The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides for the right of trial by
jury except as to direct contempts in the labor cases within its
scope. 08 This is more limited in scope than Senator Norris' original
bill which would have allowed trial by jury in all cases of indirect
contempts. 10 9 The Act also provides for the retirement and substi-
tution of the judge sitting in the proceeding if the contempt con-
102 15 U. S. C. A. sec 4.
103 In re Debs, (1895) 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. Ed. 1092. See W. D. Lewis, "A
Protest Against Administering Criminal Law by Injunction," (1894) 33 Am.
L. Reg. (n. s.) 879; C. N. Gregory, "Government by Injunction," (1898) 11
Harv. L. Rev. 487; W. H. Dunbar, "Government by Injunction," (1897) -13
L. Q. Rev. 347.
104 Sec. 22, par. 2; 38 Stat. 730, 739, 2i U. S. C. A., sec. 387.
105Ex parte Hudgings, (1919) 249 U. S. 378, 383.
106 Sec. 21; 38 Stat. 730, 738; 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 386. See discussion by
Frankfurter and Landis, "Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers,"
(1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1038-1042.107 Michaelson v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 42, 66, 69 L. Ed. 162, 45
S. Ct. 18.
108 29 U. S. C. A., sec. 111. Possibly this includes both criminal and civil
contempts. See Orfield, "The Norris-LaGuardia Act," (Bar Proc. 1939) 18
Neb. L. Bull. 153, 157.
109 C. H. Thomas, Problems of Contempt of Court, (1934) 45.
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sists of an attack upon his character or conduct." 0 Possibly this
section is applicable in non-labor cases also."'
A federal statute"2 provides that anyone who is an American
citizen or domiciled therein may, though outside the United States,
be subpoenaed as a witness at the trial of a criminal action when
desired by the Attorney General. There is a provision for personal
service by an American consul with tender of traveling expenses.
On failure to appear, an order to show cause why the recalcitrant
should not be punished for contempt may be issued, and his prop-
erty in the United States seized to satisfy the fine assessed. On
being found guilty of contempt under this statute and his property
to the extent of $100,000 being seized, petitioner, a citizen of the
United States domiciled in France appealed. The Supreme Court
affirmed. It was held that there was no violation of the Fifth
Amendment. There was due process since there was appropriate
notice and an opportunity, to be heard. Apparently a contempt of
this particular kind may occur without the borders of the United
States." 3 Judgment may be rendered though the accused never
comes to the United States and in his absence since adequate notice
is given. The court stated that
"contempt proceedings are sui generis and not 'criminal prosecutions' within
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment or of common understanding."
The court stated that the petitioner could not properly raise the
question that failing to make subpoenas available to the accused as
well as to the government was a denial of "compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor" under the Sixth Amendment."
4
The witness has no concern with the rights of the parties to the
case in which he is subpoenaed.
Procedure in Constructive Contempt
The venue of a prosecution for contempt under the Clayton Act
is not governed by the provisions of the Judicial Code relating to
venue of civil and criminal cases. Contempt for violation of an
order of court may be punished in the division of the district in
which the order was passed, although disobedience occurs in
another division." 5 Possibly this case simply controls the situation
110 29 U. S. C. A., sec. 112. This embodies the hope of Taft, C. J. in Cook
v. United States, (1925) 267 U. S. 517, 69 L. Ed. 767.
111 (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1264.
11228 U. S. C. A., sections 711-718; 44 Stat. 835 (1926).
113 Blackmer v. United States, (1932) 284 U. S. 421, 52 Sup. Ct. 252, 76 L.
Ed. 375, noted 9 Boston U. L. Rev. 143; 27 Columb. L. Rev. 204; 32 Columb. L.
Rev. 747; 17 Corn. L. Q. 117; 1 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 132, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1067;
43 Harv. L. Rev. 121; 2 Idaho L. J. 211; 30 Mich. L. Rev. 137, 968; 17 St. Louis
L. Rev. 85; 6 So. Calif. L. Rev. 60; 65 U. S. L. Rev. 639; 40 Yale L. J. 1325.
114 See (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 441. Criminal offenses by American citizens
abroad have been punished. United States v. Bowman, (1922) 260 U. S. 94,
43 Sup. Ct. 39 (conspiracy in Rio De Janiero, Brazil to defraud a corporation
of the United States was the sole stockholder) see (1927) 27 Columb. L. Rev.
204, 210; 30 Mich. L. Rev. 137, 141; 30 Mich. L. Rev. 968.
V15 Myers v. United States, (1924) 264 U. S. 95, 68 L. Ed. 577, 44 Sup. Ct.
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where the contempt takes the form of violation of an injunction,
though this was not stated by the Court. Moreover the case does
not say that contempts in different districts could be punished. 116
It has been implied that criminal contempt of a court of equity
should be punished by a proceeding in a court of law or on the law
side of the court." 7 But another case seems to imply the doctrine
that every court has jurisdiction to punish contempts of itself and
that no court can punish contempt of another court."8 The latter
doctrine was applied even where the two courts were presided over
by the same judge.
As to cases of disobedience mentioned in the Clayton Act, it is
provided that the "trial shall conform, as near as may be, to the
practice in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or upon
information."" 9
A criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the court
may be commenced by an information. 20 Under the Clayton Act a
rule to show cause issues upon a showing that there is "reasonable
ground to believe that any person has been guilty" of contempt
within the act, and such showing may be "by the return of a proper
officer on lawful process" or "upon affidavit of some credible per-
son" or "by information filed by any district attorney.'
2'
Where the contempt is not one calling for summary punishment,
the proper practice is by a rule to show cause, containing enough
to inform the accused of the nature of the contempt charged.
122
Attachment and arrest are not proper. There must be a charge
against the accused. The accused must have an opportunity to pre-
sent his defense by witnesses and argument. However, the exact
form of the procedure is not important. The accused has the right
to assistance of counsel, if he requests it. He has the right to offer
272. The Clayton Act was silent as to venue in contempt proceedings.
In United States v. Goldman, (1927) 277 U. S. 299, 72 L. Ed. 862, 48 Sup.
Ct. 486, 487 Mr. Justice Sanford cited the Myers case as holding that "a pro-
ceeding instituted by the United States for the punishment of a criminal
contempt committed by a violation of an injunction is not a criminal
prosecution within the provisions of the Sixth Amendment relating to venue
in a jury trial."
318 Compare Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure,
(1929) vol. 7, see. 3714.
117 Michaelson v. United States, (1934) 266 U. S. 42, 64, 69 L. Ed. 162, 35
A. L. R. 451. That this is erroneous is asserted in Durfee, Cases on Equity,
(1928) 159, note 14.
118 EX parte Bradley, (1869) 74 U. S. 364, 19 L. Ed. 214.
I'D 18 U. S. C. A., section 387.
120 United States v. Shipp, (1906) 203 U. S. 563, 51 L. Ed. 319, 27 Sup. Ct.
165; Toledo Newspaper C6. v. United States, (1918) 247 U. S. 402, 62 L. Ed.
1186, 38 Sup. Ct. 560; United States v. Goldman, (1928) 277 U. S. 229, 72 L. Ed.
862, 48 Sup. Ct. 486. In United States v. Shipp, it was held that the court or
judge is not a party to the proceeding.
An information was used in Clark v. United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 1, 9,
53 S. Ct. 465, 77 L. Ed. 993, 997 where the contempt was in the presence of the
court, but only later discovered to be such.
121 28 U. S. C. A., section 387.
122 Cook v. United States, (1925) 267 U. S. 517, 534, 69 L. Ed. 767, 773; Re
Savin, (1889) 131 U. S. 267, 33 L. Ed. 150, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 699.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 239
evidence in mitigation of punishment. If possible, the substitution
of another judge may be desirable, except where the accused delib-
erately shows by a personal attack to deserve the judgment.
When a contempt is not committed in open court the accused
is entitled to a hearing and the assistance of counsel.123 This is
true where the alleged contempt was the delivery of a derogatory
letter to a judge in his chambers.
The alleged contemner may enter a plea of not guilty.124 He
may move to dismiss on the ground that the information discloses
on its face that the proceeding was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. On a prosecution appeal the latter was treated as the equiva-
lent of a special plea in bar.
It is within the discretion of the court in a contempt proceeding
to refuse to hear evidence offered in mitigation, where such evi-
dence consists of the testimony of a large number of witnesses,
and the defendants have been afforded opportunity to state the
facts which might excuse or mitigate their conduct.
2 5
Apparently the evidence need not be taken in open court.1
28 It
may be taken before a commissioner or special examiner. 27 In one
case128 a special examiner was appointed with an understanding
that at the trial the parties might also introduce additional testi-
mony either oral or documentary. The testimony taken by the
examiner was lodged with the district judge and in accordance with
a nunc pro tunc order, indorsed as "filed with the court pending
trial in open court."
Even though improper evidence be admitted in a proceeding
before a judge to punish for contempt, this does not necessarily
constitute ground for reversal on appeal, since the appellate court
will merely reject it, and proceed to decide the case as if it was not
in the record .
29
An early case held that an accused has the right to purge him-
self under oath of the contempt as to contempts not committed
directly "under the eye or within the view of the court."' 3 0 The
court is not bound however to require service of interrogatories
upon the accused so that in answering them he might purge himself
123 Cook v. United States, (1925) 267 U. S. 517, 45 S. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767.
See (1935) 14 Neb. L. Bull. 182.
124 United States v. Goldman, (1928) 277 U. S. 229, 72 L. Ed. 862, 48 Sup.
Ct. 486.
125 Sinclair v. United States, (1929) 279 U. S. 749, 766, 73 L. Ed. 938, 946.
The court said that Cook v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 537, 538, 69 L. Ed.
767, 774,, 775, 45 Sup. Ct. 390, was not intended to limit such discretion.
128 United States v. Goldman, (1928) 277 U. S. 229, 72 L. Ed. 862, 48 Sup,
Ct. 486.
127 United States v. Shipp, (1906) 203 U. S. 563, 51 L. Ed. 319, 27 Sup. Ct.
165; United States v. Shipp, (1909) 214 U. S. 386, 53 L. Ed. 1041, 29 Sup.
Ct. 637.
128 United States v. Goldman, (1928) 277 U. S. 229, 72 L. Ed. 862, 48 Sup.
Ct. 486.
129 Sinclair v. United States, (1929) 279 U. S. 749, 767, 73 L. Ed. 938, 947.
1o Ex parte Savin, (1889) 131 U. S. 267, 278, 33 L. Ed. 150, 154.
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of the contempt charged. It may in its discretion adopt such mode
of determining that question as it deems proper, provided due
regard is had to the rules obtaining in trials of matters of contempt.
Back in 1906 in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes the Supreme
Court greatly limited the power of purging contempt by sworn
denials. It was held that sworn answers denying any participation
in the alleged murder of a prisoner under sentence of death in a
state court, pending his appeal to the Supreme Court from an
order of a circuit court denying relief by habeas corpus, were not
sufficient to purge the affiants of a charge of contempt of the Su-
preme Court by taking part in such murder after the appeal had
been allowed and a stay of proceedings ordered. Mr. Justice Holmes
stated:
"On this occasion we shall not go into the history of the notice.- It may be
that it was an intrusion or perversion of the canon law, as is suggested by
the propounding of interrogatories and the very phrase, 'purgation by oath'
(juramentum purgatorium). If so, it is a fragment of a system of proof
which does not prevail in 'theory or as a whole; and the reason why it has not
disappeared perhaps may be found in the rarity with which contempts occur.
It may be that even now, if the sole question were the intent of an ambiguous
act, the proposition would apply."'
31
In 1933 in an opinion by Cardozo, J., it was finally ruled that
the oath of a contemner is no longer a bar to a prosecution for con-
tempt.132 The court stated:
"Little was left of that defense after the decision of this court in United
States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 574, 51 L. Ed. 319, 324, 27 S. Ct. 165, 8 Ann.
Cas. 265. Since then there has been no'purgation by oath where an overt act
of defiance is the gist of the offense. The point was reserved whether sworn
disavowal would retain its ancient force (if the sole question were the intent
of an ambiguous act).
"The time has come, we think, to renounce the doctrine altogether and
stamp out its dying embers. It has ceased to be a defense in England since
1796."
It is improper to impose a general sentence for separate acts of
contempt alleged and found against the defendant. 133 The punish-
ment for different offenses should be so separated that the appellate
court can analyze the evidence and determine which, if any, of the
charges are sustained.
131 United States v. Shipp, (1906) 203 U. S. 563, 574, 51 L. Ed. 319, 324.
See the continuation of the case (1908) 214 U. S. 386, 53 L. Ed. 1041; (1909)
54 L. Ed. 1213; (1909) 54 L. Ed. 337. Three prisoners received ninety days,
and three sixty days in the jail of the District of Columbia, (1909) 54 L. Ed.
337.
132 Clark v. United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 1, 19, 53 S. Ct. 465, 77 L. Ed.
993, 1002. See (1913) 8 Ill. L. Rev. 210; note by Kenneth Sears, 21 II. B. J.
32 (June 1933); 24 I1. L. Rev. 598; 31 Mich. L. Rev. 850; Curtis, "The Story
of a Notion in the Law of Criminal Contempt," (1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 51;
(1907) 9.L. R. A. (n. s.) 1119; (1929) L. R. A. 1917E, 654; Seymour D. Thomp-
son, "Procedure in Cases of Criminal Contempts," (1884) 5 Grim. L. Mag.
483, 508; Ann. Cas. 1915D, at 1055; Durfee, Cases on Equity, (1928) 153, note 5.
133 Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., (1910) 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. Ed.
797, 31 Sup. Ct. 492.
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The judgment should be entered of record in such a way as to
meet attack by appeal or habeas corpus. 3 4 Even in the case of a
summary commitment there should be a proper and sufficient
record. 13 5
Habeas Corpus
It was early ruled that the Supreme Court would not itself
grant a writ of habeas corpus where a party has been committed
for contempt by a court of competent jurisdiction.136 The court
for such purpose thought a contempt similar to a crime. Mr. Justice
Story stated that
"when a court commits a party for a contempt, their adjudication is a convic-
tion, and their commitment, in consequence, is execution.""13
Where a lower federal court undertakes to punish for contempt
one refusing to obey an order which it had no strict jurisdiction
to make, the Supreme Court may discharge the accused on a writ
of habeas corpus.
138
The Supreme Court exercised original jurisdiction in discharg-
ing on habeas corpus a petitioner who had been punished for con-
tempt solely because the trial court thought he was committing
perjury.139 The Court regarded the case as so exceptional in char-
acter as to call for this remedy, but pointed out that in ordinary
cases there should be resort to other available sources of judicial
power.
Review
At common law contempt cases were not reviewable. 140 In
England findings of criminal contempt are not appealable. 141 The
Supreme Court as recently as 1904 upheld their appealability under
the Act of March 3, 1891.142 Possibly the effort to use habeas corpus
as a substitute for appeal ended only as recently as 1923.143 Prior
1
34
Ez parte Savin, (1889) 131 U. S. 267, 33 L. Ed. 150, 9 Sup. Ct. 699.
135 EX parte Terry, (1888) 128 U. S. 289, 32 L. Ed. 405, 406, 407, 9 Sup. Ct.
77; Ex parte Cuddy, (1889) 131 U. S. 280, 33 L. Ed. 154, 8 Sup. Ct. 703.
136 Ex parte Kearney, (1822) 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 39, 5 L. Ed. 391.
137 7 Wheat 39, 43, 5 L. Ed. 391, 392.
1 8 In re Sawyer, (1888) 124 U. S. 200, 31 L. Ed. 402, 8 Sup. Ct. 482;
Ex parte Fisk, (1885) 113 U. S. 713, 718, 28 L. Ed. 1117, 1119, 5 S. Ct. 724, 726.
139 Ex parte Hudgings, (1919) 249 U. S. 378, 63 L. Ed. 656. See note (1938)
16 N. C. L. Rev. 389, 390; Talbert, "Review of Contempt Proceedings by Habeas
Corpus," (1912) 46 Am. L. Rev. 838; Mc Lemore, "Review of Contempt Proceed-
ings by Habeas Corpus," (1912) 74 Cent. L. J. 152.
' 40 Bessette v. Conkey Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 324, 330, 24 Sup. Ct. 665, 48
L. Ed. 997, 1003.
141 Nelles, "The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt," (1931) 31
Columb. L. Rev. 956, 958, note 6, citing Oswald, Contempt of Court, (3rd ed.
1911) 229; En parte Yates, (1809) 4 Johnson (N.Y.) 318, 369; Case of
Shaftsbury, 1 Mod. 144.
142 Bessette v. Conkey Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 324, 24 Sup. Ct. 665. Review
was by writ of error and not by appeal. Durfee, Cases on Equity, (1928) 157,
note 11. Today, however, writ of error is abolished, and appeal takes its place.
See note (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rev. 389, 391.
143 Craig v. Hecht, (1923) 263, U. S. 255, 44 Sup. Ct. 103, Holmes and
Brandeis, J. J. dissenting. There was a concurring opinion by Taft, C. J.
while Sutherland, J., took no part.
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to the Act of 1891 review in criminal cases was upon certificate
of division of opinion.1 -4  And the Supreme Court had issued
certiorari in aid of habeas corpus proceedings and applications for
prohibition, by which the facts had been brought before the Court,
and the Court had then passed on the merits of the decision in the
lower court.145 The reason for the limited review of criminal con-
tempt was that they were of a criminal nature and no provision had
been made for review of criminal cases. But since the Act of 1891
allowed review by writ of error in criminal cases it does so also in
criminal contempt cases. The order in the criminal contempt case
imposing punishment is final and should therefore be reviewed like
a final decision in other criminal cases. The fact that trial of con-
tempt is by the court does not affect the mode of review.
As to the scope of review only matters of law are considered.
The decision of the trial tribunal on the facts is final.
46
In one case the Court held that disobedience to process of equity
in a civil action was contempt of a criminal nature, and distinct
from the civil action in the course of which the attachment for
contempt was issued.147 Furthermore since the attachment was of
a criminal character it could not be taken up to the Supreme Court
on error but only on a certificate of difference of opinion between
the judges, the early method of review in criminal cases. It has
been asserted that the ordinary method of raising the question of
the legality of the commitment in the Supreme Court is by a writ
of habeas corpus.148 The same writer suggests that in the case of
"commitment for contempt in the case of civil proceedings where no separate
process is issued, but the party offending is dealt with upon motion for a mere
breach of an order of the court pending the progress of the suit, that the
question cannot be taken directly up to the higher court, either by appeal or
by writ of error. In such a case, if there be no ground for habeas corpus, the
determination of the question of contempt by the higher court must await the
final disposition of the principal suit."
That is to say it is asserted that where there is a contempt,
whether civil or criminal arising during a civil proceeding there may
be no review of the decision on the question of contempt until final
disposition of the civil suit.
In 1880 Chief Justice Waite thus spoke of the reviewability of
contempts:
"If the proceeding below, being for contempt, was independent of and
separate from the original suit, it cannot be re-examined here either by writ of
1
4 4 New Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co., (1874) 20 Wall (U. S.) 387,
22 L. Ed. 354.
145 Bessette v. Conkey Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 324, 334, 24 Sup. Ct. 665, 48 L.
Ed. 997, 1004. See (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rev. 389, 390.
146 Bessette v. Conkey Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 324, 338, 24 Sup. Ct. 665, 48
L. Ed. 997, 1006.
'14
7 New Orleans v. Steamship Co., (1874) 20 Wall. (U. S.) 387, 22 L. Ed. 354.
148 Beale, "Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil," (1908) 21 Harv. L. Rev.
161, 168, citing Ex parte Terry, (1888) 128 U. S. 289, 32 L. Ed. 405, 9 Sup.
Ct. 77.
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error or appeal. This was decided more than fifty years ago in Ex parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat., 38, and the rule then established was followed as late as
New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 387 (87 U. S., xxii, 354)1."149
Mr. Justice Brandeis thus stated the rule as to method of
review:
"Where a fine is imposed, partly as compensation to the complainant and
partly as punishment, the criminal feature of the order is dominant and fixes
its character for purposes of review."'150
He also stated that an order punishing one criminally for con-
tempt, is a final judgment.1 51
On appeal findings of fact supported by any competent and
substantial evidence will not be disturbed. In a case where de-
fendants, concluded that there was no evidence that newspaper
articles presenting the basis for the prosecution tended to obstruct
the administration of justice, the Supreme Court said that it would
not consider the weight of the evidence, but simply whether the
evidentiary facts found by the court below had any reasonable
tendency to sustain general conclusions of fact based thereon.
152
On appeal the facts were reviewed in one case to this extent:
The Supreme Court held an adjudication of contempt improper
where there was no material evidence to connect the alleged con-
temner with the act charged, and he denied any connection, although
there were circumstances affording reasonable ground for suspect-
ing his participation.
15 3
In civil contempt proceedings on appeal the whole record ma
be examined. In criminal contempt proceedings the evidence as
to disobedience of injunction cannot be examined if there be no bill
of exceptions.154 The character and purpose of the punishment de-
termines whether the contempt is criminal or civil. Civil contempt
is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant. Criminal con-
tempt is punitive and to vindicate the authority of the court.-
In criminal contempt the proceedings are not a part of the main
cause, whereas in civil contempt they are. In criminal contempt
the petition is properly entitled "United States v. Accused" or "In
re Accused." Such title enables the accused to know that it is a
charge and not a suit. Civil contempt proceedings are entitled as in
the principal suit.
149 Hayes v. Fischer, (1880) 102 U. S. 121, 26 L. Ed. 95, 96.
150 Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, (1922) 259 U. S. 107, 110, 66 L. Ed. 848, 24
Sup. Ct. 427, 428. He cited In re Merchants' Stock Co., Petitioner, (1912) 223
U. S. 639, 32 Sup. Ct. 339, 56 L. Ed. 584. See (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rev. 389, 394.
151 Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, (1922) 259 U. S. 107, 111, 66 L. Ed. 848, 24
Sup. Ct. 427, 428. See (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rev. 389, 393.
152 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, (1918) 247 U. S. 402, 62 L. Ed.
1186, 38 Sup. Ct. 560.
V;3 Sinclair v. United States, (1929) 279 U. S. 749, 73 L. Ed. 938.
154 Gompers v. Bucks Stove and R. Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. Ed. 797.
The court does not seem to accept the argument that on review of criminal con-
tempt the scope of review is confined to the legal question of whether the alleged
disobedience constitutes contempt.
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An appeal from an order adjudging a person guilty of criminal
contempt is governed by the statute requiring application for allow-
ance of appeal to be made within three months after judgment and
not by the Criminal Appeal Rules, since there was no plea of guilty,
no verdict of guilt by a jury, and no finding of guilt by the court
where a jury was waived pursuant to the rules.1 '5
The pardoning power of the President under Article 2, section
2, clause 1, extends to fully completed criminal contempts of
court. 56 The language "offenses against the United States" used
in that provision is broad in its meaning, and does not include only
crimes defined and punished by Act of Congress. It has a wider
meaning than it has in Article I, section 8 covering "offenses
against the law of nations," and as used in the double jeopardy
provision of the Fifth Amendment. It covers more than- "crimes"
and criminal prosecutions.
155 Nye v. United States, (1942) 61 Sup. Ct. 810. See (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rev.
389, 392, as to appeal where a jury trial is provided by statute as to certain
contempts; it is asserted that there the Criminal Appeal Rules would apply.
'16 Ex parte Grossman, (1925) 267 U. S. 87, 69 L. Ed. 527, 45 S. Ct. 332.
38 A. L. R. 131 (liquor injunction). See also 23 A. L. R. 524; 21 Ill. L. Rev.
379; 38 Yale L. J. 819; 24 Ill. L. Rev. 483; 14 Iowa L. Rev. 447; 14 Corn. L. Q.
484; 13 Minn. L. Rev. 506; 9 Minn. L. Rev. 574. See discussion in Thomas,
Problems of Contempt of Court, (1934) 75-96; Attorney General's Survey of
Release Procedures, (1939) Vol. III, Pardon, p. 140.
FOR CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS: EXAMPLE OF OBJECTIVE TEST
Following are "True-False" statements. They are samples of such as may be
used in an "objective" examination. The candidate writes "T" or "F" before or after
each statement according as he thinks it is true or false. With a key at hand any one
who can read is competent to grade the papers. Good professional judgment is re-
quired only in making up the statements.
We invite correspondence with Civil Service Commissions on the subject of
examinations especially. We will be glad to help them with their problems as far as
possible.
(1) A grand jury commonly refuses to admit or pay attention to hearsay evidence.
(2) If an officer stops a speeding car and the driver locks the car door and refuses
to accompany the officer, he may lawfully use force to open the door.
(3) Intoxication is never a defense but always an excuse.
(4) If mortal wound is inflicted in State A, and the party dies in State B, the
slayer may be tried in either state.
(5) In felonies there may be accessories while in misdemeanors all participants
are principals.
(6) Evidence of the bad character of the defendent is always admissible.
(7) A car going 40 miles an hour produces approximately twice as much energy as
the same car going 20 miles per hour.
(8) The laws of evidence deal with admissibility of evidence, not weight.
(9) In general crimes mala in se (morally wrong) are punishable whether or not
there is a criminal intent.
(10) Contributory negligence has no application in criminal cases.
(11) Confession, to be admissible in court, must be signed, sworn to or witnessed.
(12) It is illegal for a police officer to use force when arresting a woman.
